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If it Looks Like a Duck: Reining 
in Private-Military Contractor 
Conduct Through the Amended 
UCMJ  
Michael Anderson 
This Note will explore the 2007 Amendment to the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, which I contend allows the military to 
exercise legal jurisdiction over a narrow-field of private-military 
contractors who act as de facto soldiers. I will first explain the 
historical roots of the military justice system and how it rose as 
a means of ensuring discipline within military ranks. From 
there I will explore the Constitutional framework of the military 
justice system, including where military justice springs from and 
how the military and civilian justice systems differ. I will 
ultimately conclude that those subject to military law are 
afforded Constitutional rights differently than those in the 
civilian justice system, and that there are narrow exceptions 
where extension of military justice over civilians is 
Constitutionally permitted. Next, I will discuss why alternatives 
to military jurisdiction of PMCs have failed and why this failure 
is an important issue. After this, I will examine relevant case 
law and conclude that PMCs are distinguishable from civilians 
who have been exempt from military jurisdiction. Namely, I will 
conclude that PMCs are more “soldier” than “civilian” and 
should thus fall under the military’s jurisdiction when they 
engage in criminal conduct. Ultimately, I will conclude that 
because a lack of PMC discipline can harm military objectives, 
PMCs act as de facto soldiers, and existing alternatives have 
failed to offer adequate oversight, the extension of military law 
over PMCs is Constitutionally permissible and should be not be 
revoked. Accordingly, the 2007 Amendment should  be upheld  if 
applied to a PMC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Case Western Reserve University School of 
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I. Introduction 
The legal system under which military personnel live and work 
has long been perceived to be markedly different from the civilian 
legal system.1 Since 1950, active service-members in the United States 
military have fallen under the jurisdiction of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (“UCMJ”).2 The UCMJ, which is promulgated by 
Congress pursuant to Constitutional authority, serves as the legal 
authority for the military and defines criminal conduct.3 For example, 
 
1. Major John W. Brooker, Improving Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
222 MIL. L. REV. 1, 35 (2014). 
2. Brigadier General Jack L. Rives & Colonel Bradley P. Grant, Explaining 
the UCMJ, 27 Rep. 15, 16 (2000). 
3. 10 U.S.C. § 801-946 (2016) [hereinafter UCMJ].  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 50 (2018) 
If it Looks Like a Duck  
309 
one of the most notable differences between civilian courts, or Article 
III courts,4 and courts-martials convened pursuant to the UCMJ, is 
the latter’s failure to provide the protections guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.5  
In 2007, despite the apparent differences between the military and 
civilian justice system,  Congress, as part of the John Warner 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,6 made a 
seemingly innocuous amendment to the provisions of Article 2(a)(10) 
(“2007 Amendment”) of the UCMJ. Article 2(a)(10) previously stated 
that civilians “serving with or accompanying an armed force in the 
field . .  in times of war” were subject to the provisions of the UCMJ.7 
The 2007 Amendment altered this provision to read “in time of 
declared war or a contingency operation.”8 Contemporary courts had 
interpreted the phrase “in times of war” to mean only a 
Congressionally declared war.9 However, there has not been a 
Congressional declared war in over fifty years,10 rendering Article 
 
4. An Article III court is a court created pursuant to Article III of the 
Constitution. These include federal district courts, state courts, 
appellate courts, and the United States Supreme Court. In other words, 
Article III courts are where United States civilians are tried. 
Throughout this Note, Article III and civilian justice system will be used 
interchangeably. 
5. Cara-Ann M. Hamaguchi, Between War and Peace: Exploring the 
Constitutionality of Subjecting Private Civilian Contractors to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice During “Contingency Operations”, 86 
N.C.L. REV. 1047, 1055-56 (2008). 
6. Kara M. Sacilotto, Jumping the (Un)Constitutional Gun?: 
Constitutional Questions in the Application of the UCMJ to 
Contractors, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 179, 180 (2008).  
7. Court-martial Jurisdiction under Amended Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ, 
http://www.ucmjdefense.com/resources/army-jag-school-criminal-law-
deskbook-volume/military-justice-system-overview/court-martial-
jurisdiction.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6PCN-
NMGL].  
8. UCMJ, supra note 3, § 802 (“(a) The following persons are subject to 
this chapter [10 USCS §§ 801 et seq.] . . . (10) In time of declared war 
or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an 
armed force in the field”). Under the statute, a contingency operation is 
defined as: “a military operation that – A) is designated by the 
Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed 
forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or 
hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against opposing 
military force; or B) results in the call or order to, or retention on, 
active duty of members of the uniformed services . . . or any other 
provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared 
by the President or Congress.”) (emphasis added). 
9. See e.g. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.R. 363 (1970). 
10. Sacilotto, supra note 6, at 180.  
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2(a)(10) largely unusable in its previous iteration. As such, the 2007 
Amendment may re-institute the application of military justice to 
civilian contractors accompanying military forces, potentially closing a 
legal-loophole that has existed for decades.11   
The changes in the language of Article 2(a)(10) were largely a 
response to public outcry following a massive shooting during the Iraq 
War resulting in the deaths of seventeen Iraqi civilians.12 In the midst 
of the Iraq War, a car approaching a police checkpoint in busy Nisour 
Square drew the attention of a small cadre of armed men.13 When the 
vehicle failed to yield, the group began to indiscriminately fire their 
weapons in the packed square.14 By the time the dust settled and the 
fracas had abated, the shooting had resulted in nearly fifty casualties, 
including the seventeen Iraqi civilians.15 The perpetrators of this 
attack, however, were not active military personnel.16 Rather the 
armed men were employed by Blackwater USA and contracted by the 
United States government to assist military personnel in Iraq.17 This 
massacre, termed by some as Baghdad’s “Bloody Sunday”,18 revealed 
to the greater public a “dirty” secret of the United States military: 
civilian contractors are frequently utilized as like replacements for 
actual military personnel in modern contingency operations. 
Blowback from the Nisour Square massacre was immediate, with 
the military investigation conducted post-shooting noting that there 
was no evidence of “enemy activity” and characterizing the 
 
11. Ingrid L. Price, Criminal Liability of Civilian Contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 49 STAN. J INT’L L. 491, 492-493 (2013). 
12. Katherine Chapman, The Untouchables: Private Military Contractors’ 
Criminal Accountability Under the UCMJ, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1048 
(2010).  
13. Blackwater Incident: What happened, BBC NEWS: AMERICAS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7033332.stm (last updated Dec. 8, 2008) 
[https://perma.cc/NA6K-XEBR]. 
14. James Glanz and Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fatal Shot to Hail of 
Fire to 17 Deaths, NY TIMES (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/10/03/world/middleeast/03firefight.html [https://perma.cc/2M7Z-
3S8U]. 
15. Wesley Bruer & Michael Pearson, Ex-Blackwater contractors sentenced 
in Nusoor Square shooting in Iraq, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2015/04/13/us/blackwater-contractors-iraq-sentencing (last updated 
Apr. 14, 2015) [https://perma.cc/SR8W-VCCC]. 
16. Ed Pilkington, Blackwater and its Soldiers of Misfortune, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2010) https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2010/jan/01/blackwater-xe-history [https://perma.cc/XYJ6-XACE]. 
17. Id. 
18. Jeremy Scahill, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S MOST 
POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY 2 (2007).  
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Blackwater employee’s actions as “criminal.”19 Iraqi civilians who 
witnessed the shooting described the event by saying “it was horror . . 
. Anything that moved in Nusoor [sic] Square was shot. Women, 
children, young people, they shot everyone.”20 While the perpetrators 
of the Nisour Square were eventually indicted for their actions,21 a 
lengthy delay preceded legal proceedings, belying the difficulties in 
holding civilian contractors serving overseas accountable for criminal 
conduct.22   
Although events like the Nisour Square shooting and atrocities 
committed by American contractors at Abu Gharib23 brought the 
United States reliance on military contractors to the general public’s 
conscience, such reliance on civilian contractors is hardly a modern 
development.24 Historically, the military has frequently used civilian 
forces to augment its strength.25 For example, General Washington 
hired numerous civilians for logistical support and to haul equipment 
for the Continental Army,26 while civilians accompanied General 
Sherman as his forces burned their way across the Confederate States 
during the Civil War.27 Recent trends suggest that the use of civilian 
contractors is poised to continue and perhaps even become more 
prevalent, as some estimates placed the ratio of soldiers to civilians 
serving during the Iraq War at 1:1.28 Other sources proffered that 
 
19. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1048. 
20. Bruer, supra note 15.  
21. Finally, A Verdict on Blackwater’s Nisour Square Shooters, THE NATION 
(Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/finally-verdict-
blackwaters-nisour-square-shooters/ [https://perma.cc/B97Z-GG99]. 
22. Bruer, supra note 15.  
23. Abu Ghraib was an American prison in Iraq used to house detainees 
captured by American forces. After a series of graphic photos emerged 
that showed detainees being subjected numerous abuses, the 
Department of Justice commenced investigations into the prison. Iraq 
Prison Abuse Scandal Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/ 
10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse-scandal-fast-facts/ (last updated 
Mar. 18, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4AUK-VDM5]. 
24. Marc Lindemann, Civilian Contractors under Military Law, 37 U.S. 
ARMY WAR C. Q. PARAMETERS, 83, 84 (2007). 
25. Id. 
26. David Snyder, Civilian Military Contractors on Trial: The Case for 
Upholding the Amended Exceptional Jurisdiction Clause of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, 44 TEX. INT’L. L. J. 65, 69 (2008).  
27. William C. Peters, On Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case for 
Courts-Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in 
Iraq, 2 BYU L. REV. 367, 377 (2006). 
28. CARLOS ORTIZ, PRIVATE ARMED FORCES AND GLOBAL SECURITY: A 
GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 28 (2010). 
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civilian contractors actually outnumbered military personnel in Iraq.29 
This ratio has continued to grow in recent years and by some 
estimates, in 2013, contractors outnumbered American military 
personnel in Afghanistan by a near 2:1 ratio.30 In contrast, during 
World War II, this ratio was greatly skewed towards soldiers, with 
nearly seven soldiers for every civilian contractor accompanying the 
military.31  
While the use of civilians as supplemental forces is not a recent 
development, the manner in which civilians have been utilized and 
deployed has drastically changed since the times of Washington and 
Sherman.32 The events of Nisour Square, perpetrated by the 
employees of Blackwater USA, is emblematic of the evolving role of a 
civilian contractor, and highlights the rise of private-military 
contractors (“PMCs”)33 as an increasingly vital component of 
American military strength.34 Although the term PMC, as typically 
used, can cover a host of contractors, from those merely involved in 
logistical support to those involved in direct combat,35 of chief concern 
to this Note is the trend towards employing PMCs who act as de 
facto soldiers by engaging in conduct typically thought as a “soldiers” 
role. For example, these PMCs often engage in front-line combat 
operations,36 dress like soldiers, bear military-weaponry,37 and provide 
security on military bases and installations.38  
29. Michael Hurst, After Blackwater: A Mission-Focused Jurisdictional 
Regime for Private Military Contractors During Contingency 
Operations, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1308, 1310 (2008).  
30. See Price, supra note 11, at 493 (noting that in 2013, nearly 110,00 
Department of Defense contractors were present in Afghanistan, while 
American military personal numbered only 66,000. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the article further points out that in 2012, contractor 
deaths had actually eclipsed those of service-members.).  
31. Ortiz, supra note 28. 
32. See Peters, supra note 27, at 377-84 (discussing the development of 
civilian contractors throughout American martial history). 
33. Although the acronym PMC encompasses many different types of 
civilian contractors, most of whom do not engage in military actions, for 
purposes of simplicity, this Note will use PMC to mean those civilian 
contractors who fill a “quasi-military” role only. For a more extensive 
and nuanced discussion of the broad spectrum of PMCs, see generally 
PETER WARREN SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE 
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003). 
34. Sacilotto, supra note 6, at 182, quoting U.S. Dep’t Of Def., Quadrennial 
Defense Review Report 75, 81 (2006) (“The Department’s Total Force--
its active and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its 
contractors--constitutes its warfighting capability and capacity.”). 
35. See generally Singer, supra note 33 (noting that contractors carried out 
military and non-military functions). 
36. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1049. 
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Part and parcel to the increasing integration of PMCs and actual 
military personnel is the need to regulate PMC’s behavior and 
conduct in the field through a system of legal oversight. As indicated 
by the 2007 Amendment, one such attempt to ensure legal 
accountability of PMCs is by placing them under the jurisdiction of 
the UCMJ.39 The use of military justice to check the behavior of 
civilians is not a novel concept and the 2007 Amendment to the 
UCMJ reflects a long-standing principle that “civilians serving 
alongside the military may be subject to courts-martial under the 
military justice system in some limited capacity.”40  
Determining how to best hold PMCs legally accountable when 
they accompany military forces overseas is no mere triviality. Firstly, 
holding PMCs criminally accountable is necessary for ensuring that 
victims of PMC criminal conduct receive personal justice.41 Secondly, 
legal accountability is necessary for pragmatic reasons, namely the 
achievement of military objectives. Particularly in contingency 
operations such as Iraq, in which military personnel are deeply 
ingrained with local civilian populations, it is necessary to foster 
amicable relationships with domestic populations to achieve military 
objectives.42 However, local populations often do not recognize or 
differentiate military personnel from PMCs, which can hamper 
American military efforts when PMCs engage in criminal conduct and 
are not held accountable.43   
 
37. Id. at 1049. 
38. Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the 
Risks to Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
112 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009). 
39. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1052-53. 
40. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 262 (C.A.A.F. 2012). 
41. See Steven Paul Cullen, Out of Reach: Improving the System to Deter 
and Address Criminal Acts Committed By Contractor Employees 
Accompanying Armed Forces Overseas, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 509, 511 
(noting that the absence of actual legal oversight of PMCs prior to the 
2007 left victims of PMC unable to seek redress for their injuries or 
grievances). 
42. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1052. 
43. Snyder, supra note 26, at 97. See also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, MOSHE 
SCHWARTZ, & KENNON H. NAKAMURA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 
32419, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL 
STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES, 38 (2008) (“News reports from Iraq indicate 
that [private security forces] may have led in some cases to a disregard 
of the sensitivities of and consequences for the Iraqi public. For a U.S. 
commander in Iraq whose mission may well include winning “hearts and 
minds,” such a disregard is problematic, some analysts argue.”). 
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Although the application of the UCMJ to PMCs is likely the most 
pragmatic option available for ensuring legal accountability of PMCs, 
the practice of such application undoubtedly raises Constitutional 
concerns. Namely, the amendment raises the issue of when it is 
permissible to subject a civilian to the legal oversight of the military, 
thus potentially depriving them of Constitutionally guaranteed rights 
required in Article III courts.44  
Despite the importance of the Constitutional questions raised by 
military oversight of civilians, the topic has continued to remain 
ambiguous in contemporary times. Even George W. Bush, an ardent 
supporter of increased reliance on PMCs during his administration, 
had little idea about what legal restrictions were placed on PMCs.45 
This Note, however, argues that subjecting PMCs to the military 
justice system is not only Constitutional, but is a superior choice to 
existing alternatives in regulating PMC conduct. Thus, any attempts 
to repeal or replace the 2007 Amendment to the UCMJ are 
unadvised.  
In Part II, this Note will discuss the rationale giving rise to a 
system of military justice separate from the civilian legal system and 
discusses the differences and similarities between the two systems. 
Part III of this Note will examine the Constitutional framework under 
which the military justice system was created, and how courts have 
approached the application of military justice to civilians under this 
framework.  Ultimately, Part III will conclude military jurisdiction 
over civilians is only permissible when: (1) the application of military 
justice is a last-resort and; (2) the person to be subjected to military 
jurisdiction is one whom could reasonably be determined to fall within 
the purveyor of land and naval forces of the United States. 
Next, Part IV will consider the alternatives to subjecting PMCs 
to military jurisdiction, primarily focusing on extending United States 
domestic law via the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
(“MEJA”). Part IV will ultimately conclude that MEJA and other 
alternatives would prove ineffective in adjudicating PMC conduct. 
Part V will then discuss the contemporary use of PMCs as quasi-
military forces. This section will conclude that contemporary PMCs 
do not fall within the gambit of civilians that have historically been 
exempted from courts-martial proceedings, and instead are more 
similar to the land and naval forces of the United States, thus 
permitting the military to exercise jurisdiction over them. Lastly, in 
 
44. Peter W. Singer, Frequently Asked Questions on the UCMJ Change and 
Its Applicability to Private Military Contractors, BROOKINGS, (Friday, 
Jan. 12, 2007), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/frequently-asked-
questions-on-the-ucmj-change-and-its-applicability-to-private-military-
contractors/ [https://perma.cc/BK9P-UMKN]. 
45. Minow, supra note 38, at 110. 
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Part VI, this Note will ultimately conclude that the 2007 Amendment 
is Constitutional and should be upheld, and further, that PMC 
permissibly fall within military jurisdiction under the 2007 
Amendment. 
II. Purposes of the Military Justice System: Do 
Military Justice and Civilian Justice Comport? 
A. Underlying Rationale of the Military Justice System 
The military justice system has frequently been described as a 
system separate and apart from the civilian justice system,46 with the 
practice of separating the military and civilian justice systems 
stretching back to the earliest days of the United States.47 In fact, the 
existence of a separate system of military justice predates the 
founding of the United States, as the Articles of War, which governed 
military justice for nearly two centuries in the United States, were 
first promulgated in 1775.48 The Articles of War, largely derived from 
both Roman and British legal traditions, served as the statutory basis 
for military justice for 175 years until the codification of the UCMJ in 
1950.49 In spite of the long history of the use of a separate military 
justice system in the United States the continued use of such a system 
raises important questions. More specifically: what are the underlying 
rationales giving rise to a military justice system separate?  
It has long been assumed that the overriding purpose of the 
military justice system was to enforce discipline and order throughout 
military ranks.50 This assumption has its roots in the belief that the 
civilian legal system is ill-suited for the unique problems faced by the 
military.51 First and foremost, the military justice system developed to 
enforce the “law of obedience”, as “[m]ilitary justice provides a 
stimulus to cultivate such habits [instantaneous obedience] by posing 
 
46. David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or 
Discipline?, 215 MIL. L. REV., 1, 5 (2013). 
47. Rives, supra note 2, at 16. 
48. Kevin J. Barry, A Face Lift (and Much More) for an Aging Beauty: 
The Cox Commission Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, 2002 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 57, 60 (2002). 
49. Id. at 58.  
50. Schlueter, supra note 46, at 6. 
51. Lieutenant Colonel James B. Roan & Captain Cynthia Buxton, The 
American Military Justice System in the New Millennium, 52 A.F. L. 
Rev. 185, 189-90 (2002) ((“An army is not a deliberative body. It is the 
executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open 
as to the right to command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in 
the soldier.”) (quoting Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1890))). 
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the threat that disobedience of commands will be penalized.”52 The 
concept of discipline is of the utmost importance in the military, for 
“discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable; 
procures success to the weak.”53 In light of this the military system 
largely developed as means to criminalize actions, such as desertion, 
which had no analogues in the civilian justice system, and further, 
would be detrimental to military structure and objectives if left 
unchecked.54 
At the center of the military justice system sits a commanding 
officer imbued with an impressively broad scope of authority.55 Prior 
to convening a court-martial, the commanding officer conducts an 
investigation, with advice from a judge-advocate general, into the 
alleged events, and can ultimately decide to punish an offending 
service member in a multitude of ways.56 If a commanding officer 
believes that an accused conduct is sufficiently criminal, then he may 
institute further investigation into whether a general court-martial, 
the military analogue to a civilian trial for felony offenses, is 
warranted.57  
To many observers, from the earliest days of the Articles of War 
through contemporary times, the fundamental nature of the military 
justice system developed merely as a tool of commanding officers to 
discipline their soldiers.58 For many who subscribe to this view, the 
incessant demand on promoting discipline and order meant that the 
principles of law and justice were largely relegated to a secondary 
concern. As a result, commanders were given near unfettered 
 
52. See id. at 189 (quoting Robinson O. Everett, Military Justice in the 
Armed Forces of the United States, THE TELEGRAPH PRESS (1956)). 
53. General George Washington, Instructions to Company Captains (29 
July 1757), available at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ 
Washington/02-04-02-0223 [https://perma.cc/8GBN-VHRN]. 
54. Roan, supra note 51, at 190. 
55. Schlueter, supra note 46, at 8-9. 
56. Id. at 9 (noting that a commander can issue four different rulings 
following the initial investigation: 1) a commander could decide that a 
simple reprimand or individual counseling would suffice; 2) a 
commander could decide that the offense was serious enough to warrant 
discharge of the soldier and begin administrative proceedings; 3) a 
commander, who decides on his own accord that the offender’s conduct 
was merely “minor” may decide to impose nonjudicial punishment. 
However, the service member is free to demand a court-martial in such 
a scenario, and; 4) a commander determines that the offense is 
sufficiently serious, he may begin to initiate court-martial proceedings 
against the offending party). 
57. Id.  
58. Barry, supra note 48, at 58. 
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authority in carrying out legal proceedings.59 However, such a 
draconian system of adjudication has often led to calls for the military 
system to reform and fall more in-line with the legal standards of the 
civilian justice system.60   
While still affording commanding officers a tool to enforce 
discipline within their ranks,61 in many facets, the military justice 
system has gradually begun to place more emphasis on the legal rights 
of the individuals under its jurisdiction.62 In fact, as noted by some 
scholars, the Manual for Courts-Martial,63 which articulates the 
procedural requirements and due process rights in courts-martial 
proceedings under the UCMJ, states that “justice” is a primary 
purpose of military law, listing justice before discipline.64 Apart from 
this language, developments in the past half-century reflect the 
growing emphasis on the theme of justice, as individuals under 
military jurisdiction have begun to receive many of the same rights of 
law found in Article III courts.65 For example, defendants in a court-
martial proceeding are protected from self-incrimination and cruel and 
unusual punishment, just as civilians are in Article III proceedings.66 
Despite recent developments, which have greatly increased the 
due process rights of those accused of crimes in the military justice 
system, it cannot be forgotten that the desire to enforce discipline is 
largely the bedrock of military justice.67 To that end, some have 
 
59. Id. at 63-64 (quoting General Samuel T. Ansell, Military Justice, 5 
CORNELL L.Q. 1, 5 (1919)) (“I have gratifying evidence of support not 
only from the public generally but from the profession - that the 
existing system of Military Justice is un-American. . . that it is a system 
arising out of and regulated by the mere power of Military Command 
rather than Law.”) (emphasis added). 
60. David A. Schlueter, American Military Justice: Responding to the Siren 
Calls for Reform, 73 A.F. L. REV. 193, 195 (noting that the military 
justice system has frequently faced calls for reform after major conflicts 
such as: World War I, World War II, and the Vietnam War). 
61. See generally Schlueter, supra note 46.  
62. Schlueter, supra note 60, at 196-197 (noting that the UCMJ was heavily 
amended in the 1980’s to bring the military justice system in closer 
accordance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence).  
63. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, pt. II, chp. II, r. 101 
(2012) [hereinafter MCM] (acting as the military equivalent of the 
Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedures by proscribing the 
appropriate procedural requirements in a court-martial proceeding).  
64. Schlueter, supra note 46, at 6 (quoting MCM).  
65. Peters, supra note 27, at 409. 
66. Snyder, supra note 26, at 91. 
67. See generally Major Christopher W. Behan, Don’t Tug on Superman’s 
Cape: In Defense of Convening Authority Selection and Appointment of 
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suggested that the concepts of discipline and justice should not be 
thought of as dichotomous themes, but rather, the two themes should 
be considered as complementary concepts to be balanced with each 
other.68 That is, the role of the commander is still given ample 
deference during courts-martial proceedings. However, the extent of a 
commander’s power has been somewhat tempered by the adoption of 
numerous procedural protections, such as the adoption of procedural 
practices that closely emulate the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
Criminal Procedure.69 Thus, while the military justice system remains 
first and foremost a tool for ensuring discipline, modern developments 
have ensured that defendants in the military justice system are 
afforded much more legal protection during courts-martial 
proceedings, a reflection of the growing emphasis of justice under the 
UCMJ.70  
B. Similarities and Differences Between the Two Legal Systems 
As befitting the creation of a separate legal systems, there are 
fairly significant differences in the procedural requirements afforded to 
defendants in the civilian and military justice systems. This Note will 
elect to highlight to two major differences between the military justice 
and civilian justice systems that potentially could create 
Constitutional concerns: the use of grand-juries and juries in the 
respective systems.71  
1.  Lack of Grand-Jury Requirement 
In the civilian justice system, a criminal defendant’s right to a 
grand-jury is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment.72 Under the Fifth  
Court-Martial Panel Members, 176 MIL. L REV. 190 (2003) (“By far the 
greatest influence on the modern court-martial, however, came from two 
different systems, the Court of Chivalry in England and the military 
code of Sweden’s King Gustavus Adolphus. These courts both struck a 
balance between the demands of good order and discipline and concepts 
of due process, thereby laying a foundation for modern systems of 
military justice that strive to do the same.”). 
68. Schlueter, supra note 46, at 28-29 (quoting Captain John S. Cooke, The 
United States Court of Military Appeals, 1975-1977: Judicializing the Military 
Justice System, 76 MIL L. REV. 43, 52 (1977) (“The precept [of the 
relationship of justice and discipline] has generally been reflected in the 
tendency of the court to distinguish and separate functions exercised by 
the commander and other line personnel . . . This tendency deserves close 
scrutiny, for it must be recognized that justice and discipline are properly but two 
sides of the same coin; to the extent that the court separates them unnecessarily, 
it risks devaluing the whole system.”) (emphasis added)). 
69. Schlueter, supra note 60, at 195-96. 
70. Schlueter, supra note 60, at 196-98. 
71. Sacilotto, supra note 6, at 207. 
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
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Amendment, however, the requirement of a grand-jury is explicitly 
omitted in cases arising in the military.73 The explicit decision to 
exclude the grand-jury requirement from the military justice system 
indicates that the Founders certainly envisioned that the military 
justice system could (and should) operate under a different set of 
procedural rules than its civilian counterpart. This is not to say, 
however, that the military justice system does not provide a 
mechanism that functions as the equivalent of a grand-jury.  Instead, 
a court-martial proceeding utilizes a mechanism known as an Article 
32 hearing.74 
Some claim that an Article 32 hearing may provide more 
protections and rights than a grand-jury does.75 The Manual for 
Courts-Martial provides that: 
Except as provided in subsection (k) of this rule, no charge or 
specification may be referred to a general court-martial for trial 
until a thorough and impartial investigation of all the matters 
set forth therein has been made in substantial compliance with 
this rule.76 
Moreover, an Article 32 hearing allows for the accused: to be 
present, to have counsel accompany him, to cross-examine adverse 
witnesses and review government evidence, and to present his own 
evidence and witnesses.77 These safeguards are noticeably absent in a 
grand-jury in a federal proceeding in the United States.78 
2.  Lack of a Jury of Peers 
A second noteworthy difference between the civilian legal system 
and its military counterpart is the absence of the jury trial in a 
military trial, or court-martial.79 The right to a jury trial is explicitly 
granted by the Constitution; in fact, as the United States Supreme 
Court has noted, the right to a jury is considered so important a 
safeguard to individual liberty that it appears in two different parts of 
 
73. Id. (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, 
when in actual service in time of war or public danger.”) (emphasis 
added). 
74. Adam R. Pearlman, Applying the UCMJ to Contractors in Contingency 
Operations, 6 AM. U. NAT’L SEC. L. BRIEF 1, 8 (2016). 
75. Id. at 9; see also Peters, supra note 27, at 409. 
76. MCM, supra note 63, at pt. II, chp. IV, r. 405(a) (emphasis added). 
77. Id. at pt. II, chp. IV, r. 405(b). 
78. Pearlman, supra note 74, at 9; see also Sacilotto, supra note 6, at 207. 
79. Hamaguchi, supra note 5, at 1055. 
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the Constitution.80 Understandably, given the importance attached to 
the right to an impartial jury, courts are wary of the lack of a jury in 
courts-martial proceedings, believing them to be inferior to civilian 
juries.81 The Sixth Amendment states that: 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district where in the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law.82 
However, while courts-martial do not utilize a jury of the 
accused’s peers, the UCMJ does provide a very similar mechanism as 
a substitute.83 While this body is known as a “panel” and is made up 
of “members”,84 it essentially serves the same fact-finding roles as a 
civilian jury85 by weighing evidence and adjudging a proper verdict 
based on the judge’s instructions.86 Further, members of military 
panels are subject to voir dire proceedings and can be peremptorily 
removed by a defendant.87 Although both a military panel and civilian 
jury serve essential the same function, many critics contend that a 
PMC would not receive an impartial trial under military jurisdiction.88 
For example, members of military of military panels are selected 
solely at discretion of the convening authority of the court-martial.89 
 
80. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955) (“Article 
III, § 2, commands that the ‘Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury; 
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall 
have been committed . . .’ And the Sixth Amendment provides that ‘In 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed . . . .’”). 
81. See id. at 17-18 ([T]here is “a great difference between trial by jury and 
trial by selected members of the military forces. . . T[]he premise 
underlying the constitutional method for determining guilt or innocence 
in federal court is that layman are better than specialists to perform this 
task.”). 
82. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
83. MCM, supra note 63, at pt. II, chp. V, r. 501. 
84. Peters, supra note 27, at 409-10. 
85. Behan, supra note 67, at 193. 
86. MCM, supra note 63, at pt. II, chp. V, r. 502(a)(2). 
87. Peters, supra note 27, at 410. 
88. See e.g. Hamaguchi, supra note 5, at 1058 (speculating that animosity 
between the actual military personnel that populate courts-martial 
panels and PMCs may lead to biases that adversely impact a PMCs 
defense).  
89. Behan, supra note 67, at 193. 
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3.  What Constitutional Protections Are Due to Individuals under the 
UCMJ? 
Irrespective of the fact that the military justice system provides 
mechanisms that effectively mimic the safeguards of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment, it may be arguable that these Constitutional 
concerns are moot.90 Simply put, the status of the modern-day PMC 
is much more akin to that of a soldier than a civilian.91 As will be 
further discussed in this Note, it has been well-settled that the 
Constitutional guarantees required in an Article III court do not 
apply to the same degree in a court-martial proceeding commenced 
pursuant to military law.92 This proposition was largely settled in the 
United States Supreme Court case Ex parte Quirin, in which the 
Court held that “the Fifth and Sixth Amendments cannot be taken to 
have extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military 
commission.”93 Thus, if a PMC could reasonably be shown to 
constitute a de facto soldier and fall under military jurisdiction, the 
claims of violation of their Constitutional rights might be largely 
irrelevant.94  
III. Constitutional Framework of Military Justice 
In 2011 the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
affirmed the court-martial conviction of a civilian contractor, Alaa 
Mohammed Ali, employed by the United States’ military to serve as a 
translator in Iraq.95 Ali’s conviction, in United States v. Ali, 
represented the first attempt to use the newly expanded reach of the 
UCMJ to prosecute a PMC for criminal conduct.96 However, while the 
decision in Ali indicates that the Amendment may survive 
Constitutional scrutiny, the factual posture of Ali could distinguish 
the case from future challenges. Vitally, the defendant in Ali was not 
 
90. Peters, supra note 27, at 410. 
91. Id. at 410. 
92. Hamaguchi, supra note 5, at 1053.  
93. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942); see also Rives, supra note 2, at 
16 (citing Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 147 (1953) (arguing that the 
holding in Burns stands for the proposition that members of the 
military are guaranteed Constitutional protections to the extent that 
affording these protections does not interfere with military duties and 
the discipline demanded by the military)).  
94. Pearlman, supra note 74, at 6.  
95. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 271 (C.A.A.F. 2012). 
96. See David C. Hammond, The First Prosecution of a Contractor Under 
the UCMJ: Lessons for Service Contractors, SERVICE CONTRACTOR, Fall 
2008, at 33. 
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a United States citizen,97 rendering any potential Constitutional 
violations largely irrelevant.98  
The Constitution, despite granting Congress the authority to 
promulgate a system of military justice, offers no specific instructions 
as to when a civilian could be subjected to military law.99 Thus, the 
Constitutional permissibility of expanded military jurisdiction under 
the 2007 Amendment remains unresolved, and a more in-depth 
examination of previous verdicts involving civilians contesting 
military oversight would likely be necessary to establish how a court 
may view the 2007 Amendment when applied to an American citizen. 
While no prior case law speaks directly to this issue, relevant case law 
does indicate that a workable solution, permitting military oversight 
under the 2007 Amendment to pass Constitutional muster, could be 
reached.    
A. Congressional Power to Create the Military Justice System 
The concept of military oversight over civilians in general has 
long served as a controversial idea, with many of the Founding 
Fathers adopting Blackstone’s philosophy that military law was 
“entirely arbitrary” and “in truth and reality, no law.”100 Despite the 
Founder’s misgivings, the Constitution does not contain any express 
restrictions on the use of military law over non-military personnel.101 
Historically, since pre-Revolution days, the United States has 
typically permitted varying degrees of military oversight to govern the 
conduct of civilian accomplices.102 
 
97. Ali, 71 M.J. at 259. 
98. Id. at 269 (“We are mindful of the Supreme Court’s repeated refusals to 
extend court-martial jurisdiction over civilians . . . However, those cases 
are factually distinguishable because the defendants in those cases were 
U.S. citizens who indisputably enjoyed the protections of the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments.”). Although the majority opinion in Ali avoids the 
Constitutional question, Chief Justice Baker’s concurring opinion 
concludes that irrespective of Ali’s nationality, his constitutional rights 
would not have been violated as  ”[i]t seems to me that if a civilian is 
sufficiently integrated into the United States Armed Forces to qualify for 
court-martial jurisdiction under Article 2(a)(10), UCMJ, then that same 
person is sufficiently integrated so as to be entitled to those Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights embedded in the UCMJ.” Id. at 277 (emphasis 
added).  
99. See U.S. CONST. 
100. Snyder, supra note 26, at 90 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 26 
(1957)) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413). 
101. See U.S. CONST. 
102. See e.g. Cullen, supra note 41, at 519 (“The 1775 Articles of War 
extended the jurisdiction of military tribunals to ‘all sutlers and 
retainers to a camp, and all persons whatsoever serving with the 
Continental Army in the field.’”); see also Sacilotto, supra note 6, at 
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Although the military justice system does adjudicate legal matters 
through the use of courts-martial proceedings, a court-martial is a not 
“court” in the same sense that the term “court” is understood in the 
civilian justice system.103 This is because the military justice system is 
not created pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, but rather, 
created by Congress, pursuant to its authority in Article I of the 
Constitution..104 In this sense, the military justice system acts in direct 
opposition to Article III courts and “every extension of military 
jurisdiction is an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the civil 
courts.”105 
The above cited distinction has numerous practical effects. For 
example, unlike Article III courts, in which certain members of the 
judiciary enjoy life tenure, there is no requirement in the military 
justice system that military trial judges be given life tenure.106 
Moreover, “common-law” does not exist in the military justice system: 
there are only crimes which have been statutorily codified by 
Congress pursuant to its Constitutional authority.107   
However, the most significant result of the military justice system 
being an Article I, rather than Article III creation, is what 
Constitutional rights are guaranteed in the military justice system. In 
sum, because a military-court martial is not a “court” as defined in 
Article III of the Constitution, the Constitutional requirements of 
Article III courts do not apply to the same degree in the military 
justice system.108 The language of the Fifth Amendment affirms this 
 
189 (noting that the provisions contained in the 1775 Articles were 
largely carried over to 1916 Articles of War). 
103. Snyder, supra note 26, at 75.  
104. Geoffrey S. Corn, Bringing Discipline to the Civilianization of the 
Battlefield: A Proposal for a More Legitimate Approach to Resurrecting 
Military-Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilian Augmentees, 62 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 491, 526 (2008). 
105. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1957). 
106. Corn, supra note 104, at 526. 
107. Snyder, supra note 26, at 75. 
108. Numerous courts, both civilian and military, have adopted this 
proposition. See Burns, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) (“Military law . . .  is a 
jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which 
governs in our federal judicial establishment . . .  the rights of men in 
the armed forces must perforce be conditioned to meet certain 
overriding demands of discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not 
the agencies which must determine the precise balance to be struck in 
this adjustment. The Framers expressly entrusted that task to 
Congress.”) (emphasis added); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942) 
(“[W]e must conclude that § 2 of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments cannot be taken to have extended the right to demand a 
jury to trials by military commission.”); Kinsella v. United States, 361 
U.S. 234, 272 (“The provisions of . . .  the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
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statement and explicitly differentiates the Constitutional requirements 
due to military personnel by stating: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public 
danger.109 
Congress’s power to regulate the laws of the military is vested in 
Art. I § 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the 
power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land 
and naval Forces.”110 Historically, this phrase had been used in 
conjunction with Art. I §8 Clause 18, which grants Congress the 
power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to 
execute the powers vested in the Congress.”111 Together, these clauses 
had been relied upon as a limited exception for Congress to create 
legal proceedings not subject to the Constitutional rights required in 
Article III courts.112  
 
of the Constitution requiring the trial of capital or otherwise infamous 
crimes in an Article III court, upon an indictment of a grand jury, by an 
impartial petit jury, are not applicable to ‘cases arising in the land or 
naval forces.’”) (emphasis added); United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 277 
(2012) (Baker, C.J. concurring) (“[T]he Constitution delimits the 
application of Fifth and Sixth Amendment to members of the United 
States Armed Forces.”). Further, Baker noted that the “exception to the 
requirement of indictment by grand jury ‘has been read over into the 
Sixth Amendment so that the requirements of jury trial are 
inapplicable.’” Id. (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 37 n.68); United States v. 
Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 205 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (“Constitutional rights may 
apply differently” in the military context.). 
109. U.S. CONST. amend. V. As noted in the preceding footnote, the military 
exemption contained in the Fifth Amendment, has, by implication, been 
read into the Sixth Amendment as well. 
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
111. See Ali, 71 M.J. at 269. Article I, § 8, Clause 18 of the United States 
Constitution is colloquially known as the “Necessary and Proper Clause” 
and acts as Congress’s authority to pass laws necessary to effectuate its 
Constitutionally enumerated powers. 
112. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 237-38, 246-47 
(1960); see also Reid, 354 U.S. at 42 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(noting that persons subject to courts-martial are not protected by the 
specific provisions of Art. III, nor are they guaranteed the rights granted 
by the Fifth or Sixth Amendment). 
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B. Military and Civilians: When Can Civilians Fall Under Military 
Jurisdiction? 
As held in Reid, however, Congress’s ability to create the laws of 
the military cannot be extended to civilians through the Necessary 
and Proper Clause alone.113 Instead, contemporary courts have held 
that it is Congress’s “war-powers” and the implied powers derived 
from them, which act as the source and authority permitting Congress 
to extend Article I § 8, Clause 14 to civilians.114 In Ali, the concurring 
opinion described these powers as being found in Article I, § 8, 
Clauses 10-13, 16.115 Among these powers include: 
The power to . . . raise and support armies; provide and 
maintain a navy; and to provide for organizing, arming, and 
discipline the military.116 
While Congress’s power to promulgate a military justice system 
separate and apart from the civilian justice is well-settled, courts have 
historically been loath to allow the extension of military justice to 
civilians and thus deprive them of the full gambit of Constitutional 
protections guaranteed in Article III courts.117 In Ex parte Milligan, 
the Supreme Court established the proposition that if civilian courts 
are “open,” then military jurisdiction of civilians is improper.118 The 
Court in Reid reaffirmed this proposition, holding that: 
 
113. Reid, 354 U.S. at 22.  
114. Ali, 71 M.J. at 269-70 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 33) (“To the extent 
that these cases can be justified, insofar as they involved trial of persons 
who were not ‘members’ of the armed forces, they must rest on the 
Government’s ‘war powers.’”). 
115. Ali, 71 M.J. at 273 (Baker, C.J., concurring). 
116. Id. (emphasis added). 
117. See, e.g., Reid, 354 U.S. at 19 (“Article I, § 8, cl. 14 empowers Congress 
‘To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces’ . . . But if the language of Clause 14 is given its natural 
meaning, the power granted does not extend to civilians.”). 
118. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (“Congress has declared the kinds of 
trial . . . for offences committed while the party is in the military or 
naval service. Every one [sic] connected with these branches . . . is 
amenable to the jurisdiction which Congress has created for their 
government . . . All other persons, citizens of states where the courts are 
open, if charged with crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of 
trial by jury.”) (emphasis added). The court went on to further state 
that “[i]t follows, from what has been said on this subject, that there are 
occasions when martial rule can be properly applied . . . [but] if this 
government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross 
usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are 
open.”) Id. at 127 (emphasis added). 
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civilian courts are the normal repositories of power to try 
persons charged with crimes against the United States . . . the 
jurisdiction of military tribunals is a very limited and 
extraordinary jurisdiction derived from the cryptic language in 
Art. I, § 8, and, at most, was intended to be only a narrow 
exception to the normal and preferred method of trial in courts 
of law.119 
Moreover, courts have historically held that military jurisdiction 
over civilians is only permissible if the civilian could be determined to 
be within the language of Article I, § 8 Clause 14.120 Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Reid succinctly highlights this 
proposition when he states: 
trial by court-martial is constitutionally permissible only for 
persons who can, on a fair appraisal, be regarded as falling 
within the authority given to Congress under Article I, § 8, 
Clause 14 to regulate the “land and naval Forces.121 
In sum, while the ability of Congress to promulgate the UCMJ 
and permit court-martials in the military is well-settled, courts have 
often cautioned that courts-martial are to be last-resort for trying 
civilians,122  and that a civilian must “reach the level of land and 
naval forces” to fall under military jurisdiction.123 Thus, to prosecute a 
PMC under the UCMJ they would have to be sufficiently shown to be 
a de facto member of the military and further, no other methods of 
adjudication would be available to ensure accountability for criminal 
action.  
 
119. Reid, 354 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added). 
120. See id. at 22-23 (“[T]he authority conferred by Clause 14 does not 
encompass persons who cannot fairly be said to be ‘in’ the military 
service . . . We recognize that there might be circumstances where a 
person could be ‘in’ the armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even 
though he had not formally been inducted into the military or did not 
wear a uniform.”). 
121. Id. at 42 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
122. See generally United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 
(1955) (Cautioning that the authority to convene a court-martial must 
be limited to the least amount of power required to achieve the 
proposed end); see also Milligan, 71 U.S. at 119, ([M]ilitary tribunals for 
civilians . . . whether in war or peace, are inconsistent with the liberty 
of the citizen, and can have no place in constitutional government.”). 
123. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 22-23 (noting that a civilian could fall within the 
land and naval forces depending on the circumstances of that civilian’s 
association with the military, but holding that a dependent of a service 
member did not reach the level of “land and naval” forces as to fall 
under Article I, § 8 Clause 14). 
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IV. Reining in PMC Behavior: Why Alternatives to 
Military Justice Fail  
A. Why Do We Need to Hold PMCs Accountable? 
Although numerous Blackwater operatives involved in the Nisour 
Square shooting would eventually be convicted for their roles in the 
tragedy, the first attempt to prosecute the instigators resulted in 
dismissal of charges.124 Following the dismissal, Iraqi citizens, many of 
whom were victims of the attack, expressed their dismay with the 
decision, believing it represented a concerted effort by the American 
judicial system to shelter the perpetrators of the attack.125 As one 
victim asked 
What are we — not human? Why do they have the right to kill 
people? Is our blood so cheap? For America, the land of justice 
and law, what does it mean to let criminals go?126 
This response illustrates the perception created by America’s 
heavy reliance on PMCs. Although the term “mercenary” may be 
somewhat of a misnomer,127 many view PMC as nothing more than 
“guns for hire” with little regard for the well-being of innocent 
civilians.128 Unsurprisingly, this negative association of PMC has a 
profound impact on the perception of the American military, which 
often works in in close conjunction with PMCs.129  
Shortly after the massacre at Nisour Square, one witness to the 
attack stated that  
 
124. Timothy Williams, Iraqis Angered as Blackwater Charges Are Dropped, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/02/us/ 
02blackwater.html [https://perma.cc/FFT4-9X9D]. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. (quoting Abdul Wahab Adul Khader, a 34-year-old bank employee 
and one of at least 20 people wounded in the melee). 
127. Singer, supra note 33, at 42-44.  
128. Id. at 44 (quoting Abdel-Fatau Musah, who claims that there is no 
distinction between the historical mercenary and contemporary PMCs, 
and that “private military companies are nothing but the old poison of 
vagabond mercenaries in new designer bottles.”). 
129. See Cullen, supra note 41, at 515-16 (noting that not only are PMCs 
often heavily armed, they frequently serve in close proximity to local 
populations. Moreover, because these PMCs are frequently in close 
contact with United States military and government personnel, when 
they do commit crimes, local populous have a difficult time 
distinguishing the conduct and simply associate PMC conduct with 
official United States policy). 
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when someone . . . gets killed by an American and that 
American is protected-untouchable, this will definitely create 
new enemies for the United States.130  
Such a mindset reflects perhaps the most compelling argument for the 
extension of military jurisdiction over PMC: when PMCs engage in 
criminal conduct and go unpunished, American military efforts can be 
greatly harmed.131 
The Nisour Square massacre, however, is far from the only 
contemporary example of PMC misconduct resulting in harm to 
foreign civilians.132 On a hot day in July 2006, a PMC employed by an 
American contracting firm called Triple Canopy bluntly told his 
colleagues that he was “going to kill someone today.”133 As the group’s 
vehicle approached the Baghdad Airport, the PMC jumped out of the 
vehicle and fired several rounds from his M4 rifle into a truck parked 
nearby.134 The perpetrator’s colleagues stated that the truck did not 
pose a threat, nor was the team in danger at the time of the attack.135  
Unsatisfied with this amount of bloodshed, the PMC proclaimed 
“I’ve [sic] never shot anyone with my pistol before,” un-holstered his 
sidearm, and proceeded to fire seven or eight rounds into the 
windshield of a nearby taxi.136 The perpetrator of these attacks, Jacob 
Washburn, was never prosecuted for his actions despite his colleagues 
reporting the incidents to their employer.137 Instead, Triple Canopy 
terminated Washburn’s colleagues, a jury cleared Triple Canopy of 
any wrongdoing, and there was no determination of whether any Iraqi 
civilians were killed or injured that July day.138 
 
130. Snyder, supra note 26, at 97. 
131. Cullen, supra note 41, at 514 (describing the negative consequences of 
PMC misconduct on military morale, as well as the adverse impact 
PMCs can have on the implementation of certain policies and strategic 
choices.  
132. C.J. Chivers, Contractor’s Boss in Iraq Shot at Civilians, Worker’s Suit 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/ 
11/17/world/middleeast/17contractors.html [https://perma.cc/SG4H-
UUE7].  
133. Id.  
134. Id.  
135. Id. 
136. Id.  
137. Tom Jackman, Security Contractor Cleared in Two Firings, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/08/01/AR2007080102350.html 
[https://perma.cc/44TW-XZ52]. 
138. Id. 
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The failure to prosecute Blackwater and Triple Canopy employees 
are indicative of the largely under-regulated behavior of PMCs, but 
the failure to prosecute PMCs goes far beyond just these two notable 
examples.139 For example, in 2007, at the height of the Iraq War, 
there were approximately 180,000 contractors, of all types, serving 
with the United States military.140 About 30,000 of these contractors 
were the type of PMCs of chief concern to this Note.141 Yet, despite 
the fact that PMCs served in such great numbers, prosecutions for 
criminal activity were few and far between.142 As one commentator 
pointed out, it would be a very charitable, if not  naïve assumption, 
to believe that not one PMC had committed any sort of criminal 
action during the first few years of the Iraq War.143 
B. Alternatives to Subjecting PMCs to Military Jurisdiction 
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the existing legal 
landscape has failed to regulate the conduct of PMCs, thus 
necessitating the extension of military jurisdiction over PMCs. Critics, 
however, may argue that existing mechanisms, namely the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”), are sufficient to hold 
PMCs accountable.144 Bearing in mind the well-settled presumption 
that civilians should be subjected to Article III courts unless there are 
not ready alternatives,145 this Note will consider MEJA as the most 
persuasive argument against extended military jurisdiction. However, 
 
139. Hurst, supra note 29, at 1316-18.  
140. Id. at 1310. 
141. Snyder, supra note 26, at 68.  
142. See Peters, supra note 27, at 367 (claiming that, as of 2006, there had 
been zero prosecutions of a PMC for criminal conduct despite the fact 
PMCs had been serving in large numbers for over two years. In 
contrast, dozens of United States military personnel were convicted of 
criminal conduct in the same time period); see also Snyder, supra note 
26, at 68 (noting how, by 2008, there had been only one prosecution of a 
PMC for criminal action despite the large number of PMCs present in 
the country). 
143. Id. at 367. 
144. Dan Stigall, An Unnecessary Convenience: The Assertion of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) over Civilians and the 
Implications of International Human Rights Law, 17 CARDOZO J. OF 
INT’L. & COMP. L. 59, 61(2009). 
145. See generally Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (discusses writs of habeas 
corpus and the jurisdiction of military commissions); see also Reid v. 
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21 (1956) (noting that civilian courts are the 
“normal repositories of power to try persons charged with crimes against 
the United States.”). 
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for a variety of reasons, MEJA does not effectively mitigate 
jurisdictional gaps created by PMCs’ unique role.146 
1.  Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
The ideal alternative to subjecting a civilian contractor to 
military jurisdiction is to simply subject civilians to existing criminal 
law in the continental United States, regardless of where the alleged 
criminal activity occurs. While such a solution is undoubtedly enticing 
in theory, such extraterritorial extension of domestic criminal law is 
plagued by a host of pragmatic concerns, effectively rendering such 
extension insufficient for purposes of ensuring criminal accountability 
of PMCs serving abroad.  
The most significant attempt to rein in civilian contractors 
conduct through extension of domestic criminal law occurred with the 
passage of MEJA in 2000.147 MEJA was largely a response to roughly 
thirty years of nearly unregulated PMC conduct in the wake of 
various court decisions.148 By passing MEJA, Congress gave the 
Department of Justice jurisdiction to pursue criminal actions against 
overseas contractors if the crime would constitute a felony when 
committed on United States’ soil.149 Initially, MEJA’s provisions only 
applied to Department of Defense contractors,150 meaning that the 
perpetrators of the notorious Abu Ghraib prison scandal, largely 
contractors retained by the Department of State, fell outside the act’s 
 
146. Stigall, supra note 144, at 68-69. 
147. Id. at 70. 
148. David Ehrhart, Closing the Gap: The Continuing Search for 
Accountability of Civilian Contractors Accompanying the Force, 34 THE 
REP. 10, 13 (2008); see also Glenn R. Schmidt, Closing the Gap in 
Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces 
Abroad– A First Person Account of the Creation of the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 51 CATHOLIC UNI. L. REV. 7, 74 
(describing the finding of 1979 General Accounting Office report on 
contractor misconduct preceding MEJA’s enactment. The report 
detailed numerous instances of civilian crime while accompanying 
military forces, including fifty-nine “serious” offenses, such as rape, 
arson, and murder, over a year-long span. The report further noted that 
a lack of ability to prosecute such crimes had a detrimental effect on 
military operations and “caused serious morale and discipline problems 
in overseas military communities.”). 
149. 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000) (MEJA has four prerequisites for Department of 
Justice jurisdiction: 1) the offense is punishable by more than a year’s 
imprisonment; 2) the conduct occurred outside the United States; 3) the 
offense was committed by a member of the U.S. Armed Forces or a 
person accompanying and/or employed by the Armed Forces; and 4) the 
conduct occurred within the scope of the maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States). 
150. Ehrhart, supra note 148, at 15. 
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reach.151 While Congress would eventually rectify this oversight in 
2004,152 this mistake foreshadowed problems to come, as MEJA 
continued to be plagued by pragmatic concerns which largely sapped 
it of any genuine effectiveness in prosecuting PMC misconduct.153  
The pragmatic shortcomings of MEJA are readily apparent upon 
examination of the Act. Chief amongst these is MEJAs reliance on 
stateside, Department of Justice attorneys, whom are tasked with 
pursuing prosecutions of criminal acts alleged to have occurred 
thousands of miles away.154 This expansive distance places an 
incredibly burdensome weight on Department of Justice prosecutors 
to carry out even the most basic of legal task associated with 
preparation for litigation.155 For example, the vast distances makes 
taking a simple deposition an incredibly difficult task.156 Additionally, 
MEJA fails to consider the inherent difficulties that manifest when 
attempting to procure witnesses and compel them to testify; it is 
highly unlikely that many foreign nationals, witness to a crime 
perpetrated by an American PMC, would be excited at the prospect 
of traveling to American soil to testify against an American citizen, 
lest they face reprisals for their testimony.157  
MEJA’s reliance on stateside prosecutors also creates massive 
evidentiary concerns, such as spoliation of vital evidence. Such fears 
are certainly not unwarranted; for example, in the wake of the Nisour 
Square shootings, it took stateside investigators from the FBI nearly 
two weeks to reach Baghdad and commence their investigation into 
the shooting.158 By that point, Blackwater employees had taken steps 
to repair and repaint vehicles that had been involved in the 
altercation, severely compromising important evidence in the 
process.159 
 
151. CONTRACTORS AND WAR: LEGAL ASPECTS OF FUTURE U.S. OPERATIONS 
213 (Malcolm Patterson & Christopher Kinsey eds., 2012). 
152. Ehrhart, supra note 148, at 15. 
153. See generally MILITARY CONTRACTORS LEGAL STATUS, OVERSIGHT, AND 
SECURITY (Richard Quigly ed., 2009) (noting that from MEJA’s 
enactment in 2000 through 2008, only 58 cases of contractor misconduct 
were referred to the Department of Justice, of which, only 13 made it to 
trial). 
154. Singer, supra note 44. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1066. 
159. See id. at 1066-1067 (noting that while stateside investigators took 
nearly two weeks to reach the site of the shooting, American military 
personnel were able to reach the scene in roughly twenty-five minutes). 
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The nature of the locales MEJA would conceivably force stateside 
prosecutors to travel dangerous and remote conflict zones, which 
further impairs its effectiveness. For example, some commentators 
have pointed out that a PMC employed by a contracting firm could 
conceivably be reassigned to a different state in the intervening time 
between criminal act and the Department of Justice commencing a 
criminal investigation.160 Moreover, as PMCs frequently accompany 
military forces in active war zones, there could be a very real threat 
that a contractor may be injured or even killed before a stateside 
prosecutor could reach the PMC.161 A last complication created by 
MEJA inserting stateside prosecutors into hostile territory is the 
inherent danger posed to the attorneys from security risks inherent 
with war zones. These dangers have led to ironic, if not compromising 
situations, in which investigating agents and attorneys’ security 
details were provided by the very contracting firms whose employees 
were accused of criminal activity.162   
Despite MEJA’s apparent ineffectiveness in holding PMCs 
criminally accountable for their overseas conduct, the Act still 
remains operative and theoretically available to prosecute criminal 
action of PMCs accompanying military forces.163 In 2008, after the 
2007 Amendment was entered into law, Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates issued a statement clarifying the concurrent relationship 
between MEJA and the UCMJ.164  
In this memorandum, Gates noted the potential for expanded 
military jurisdiction to create legal issues and cautioned against 
excessive utilization of military jurisdiction over civilians.165 To wit, 
Gates stated that upon the Department of Defense notifying the 
Department of Justice of potential criminal conduct, the Department 
of Justice would be afforded “the opportunity to pursue its 
 
160. See Singer, supra note 44 (noting that a contractor originally employed 
in Iraq could very be easily reassigned to an equally far-flung locale such 
as Sudan or the Philippines). 
161. See Chapman, supra note 12, at 1066 (noting the lack of motivation to 
prosecute PMCs due to issues of traveling and building a case within 
war zones). 
162. See id. at 1066 (noting that Blackwater, through its contract with the 
Department of State, was responsible for providing security details for 
the investigating agents from the Department of State in the wake of 
the Nisour Square Shootings). 
163. Stigall, supra note 144, at 70-72. 
164. Id. at 72. 
165. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Secretaries of 
the Military Departments, (Mar. 10, 2008) (cautioning that “[t]he 
unique nature of this extended UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians requires 
sound management over when, where, and by whom such jurisdiction is 
exercised.”) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Gates Memorandum]. 
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prosecution . . . in federal district court.”166 This likely indicates a 
preference that the Department of Justice prosecute the case, but if 
unable or unwilling to, the military would be permitted to step in to 
fill the jurisdictional void and pursue criminal prosecution pursuant to 
Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ. 
Under this framework, the Department of Justice would still be 
notified first and “given the opportunity to pursue its prosecution of 
its case in federal district court.”167 In the interim, however, military 
commanders were instructed to conduct customary pre-trial 
investigations, in preparation for potential court-martial 
proceedings.168 In sum, Department of Justice prosecutors would 
generally be assumed to have “first-choice” in pursuing a criminal 
investigation of alleged PMC misconduct, while military personnel are 
simultaneously allowed to conduct their own investigation in the 
event the Department of Justice declines to indict a PMC.  
As some have cautioned, however, mere pragmatic difficulties 
associated with trying PMCs in Article III courts may not render 
these courts unavailable.169 To be more specific, there is a concern 
that even if prosecution under MEJA is de facto unavailable for 
reasons previously discussed, prosecution is still technically available 
in an Article III court.170 As such, prosecution of a civilian pursuant to 
the UCMJ is not truly a last-resort.  
While such concerns are compelling, dicta in Ali does indicate 
courts are cognizant of the pragmatic challenges that largely render 
 
166. Id. (emphasis added). 
167. Stigall, supra note 144, at 72 (quoting Gates Memorandum, supra note 
165). 
168. See id. at 72 (noting that Secretary Gates memorandum stated that 
“While the DOJ notification and decision process is pending, 
commanders and military criminal investigators should continue to 
address the alleged crime. Commanders should ensure that any 
preliminary military justice procedures that would be required in 
support of the exercise of UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians continue to 
be accomplished during the concurrent DOJ notification process. 
Commanders should be prepared to act, as appropriate, should possible 
U.S. federal criminal jurisdiction prove to be unavailable to address the 
alleged criminal behavior.”). 
169. See Price, supra note 11, at 502 (noting that a court may be compelled 
to find that the mere existence of an Article III court could mean that 
an Article III court is available, irrespective of the pragmatic difficulties 
that exist). 
170. See id. at 502 (“At the same time, the mere existence of MEJA could 
nullify such an argument because even if DOJ chooses not to pursue a 
case, the possibility of prosecution in an Article III court remains 
available and may make it unconstitutional to pursue prosecution in a 
limited-rights venue like a court-martial.”). 
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MEJA unavailable as a tool for prosecuting PMCs on foreign soil,171 
which may help dispel the notion that MEJA is a viable alternative. 
Moreover, the Gates’s memorandum may provide a solution to this 
conundrum in its implied suggestion of a “tiered-system” of 
jurisdiction.172 For example, the Department of Justice could be given 
an opportunity to prosecute a PMC under MEJA. But if, for example, 
the Department of Justice elected to not pursue the matter for 
pragmatic reasons, it could expressly deny jurisdiction and pass the 
case to the military. In doing so, the Department of Justice would, in 
effect, be closing the doors of Article III courts to PMCs, leaving the 
military justice system as a true last-resort.   
2.  Other Alternatives to Military Jurisdiction 
While MEJA will be considered to be the “best” alternative to the 
extension of military jurisdiction, it should be noted that some have 
argued that other alternatives exist.173 Thus, these alternatives will be 
briefly noted. First, some contend that PMCs could merely be 
subjected to the laws of the “host” nation where they are currently 
serving.174 Secondly, some have advocated for PMCs to be subjected 
to international law, namely the provisions of the Geneva 
Convention.175 It is likely, however, that many of the same 
Constitutional concerns raised by subjecting PMCs to military 
jurisdiction would be present under these alternatives. For example, 
as one commentator notes, subjecting PMCs to either of these 
alternatives could lead to unpredictable or inconsistent results.176 To 
wit, under both of these alternatives, a PMC could face liability for 
criminal action in one country, while a PMC in a different nation 
would not be held culpable for the same conduct.177 Moreover, under 
international law, PMCs could face different liability merely based on 
their own nationality.178 Under both of these examples, PMCs would 
 
171. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 259 (2012) (noting that the dicta in 
the lower court’s opinion pointed to the resource challenges - it was 
easier to hold a court-martial than to send the defendant to the United 
States to be prosecuted in federal court). 
172. Gates Memorandum.  
173. Hurst, supra note 29, at 1311.  
174. See e.g. id. at 1311 (arguing for the creation of a “tiered” system of 
jurisdiction in which host-nation law is given preference over United 
States military jurisdiction). 
175. See generally Stigall, supra note 144 (contending that UCMJ 
jurisdiction is largely unnecessary, as international law would be 
sufficient to hold PMCs accountable). 
176. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1059-1063. 
177. Id. at 1063. 
178. Id. 
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be left guessing as to what is or is not criminal conduct, leading to 
equitable concerns that are not as prevalent under military law. 
The pragmatic and equitable concerns of these above cited 
alternatives notwithstanding, these alternatives should not be 
considered “true” alternatives, as they are not Article III courts. 
Thus, for purposes of this Note, MEJA will be the most “important” 
alternative considered. 
V. Civilians in the “Land and Naval Forces”: 
Distinguishing Contemporary PMCs from Other 
Civilians 
A. Role of the Civilian Contractor: Then and Now 
As some have put it, the modern-day PMC is tasked with duties 
that are far more demanding than simply cooking or doing laundry for 
the military.179 The massive increase in the use of civilian contractors 
can in part be explained by increasing reliance on technically 
sophisticated weapons platforms, which frequently demand 
examination, maintenance, or calibration.180 More importantly, the 
end of the Cold War drastically increased the demand for PMCs 
acting as fill-ins for actual soldiers.181 Some have even noted that the 
increase may have partially been spurred by the fact it is more 
politically palatable to stomach the deaths and causalities of PMCs, 
rather than actual soldiers.182 
PMCs in contemporary times are frequently tasked with combat-
related roles including armed security, target specialists, and 
reconnaissance operations.183 Additionally, PMCs have served vital 
roles in the procurement and analysis of military intelligence.184 Some 
PMCs have also been used similar to military personnel, in that they 
are deployed to the battlefield in large numbers and supported by a 
 
179. Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, 
Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. 
L. Q. 1001, 1019.  
180. Lindemann, supra note 24, at 84.  
181. See Singer, supra note 33, at 49 (noting that the end of the Cold War 
drastically increased the use of PMC as quasi-soldiers for numerous 
reasons.); see also Michaels, supra note 124, at 1020 (noting that along 
with technological transformations, considerable cutbacks in military 
spending in the early 1990’s has helped lead to increased utilization of 
private contractors as combat-forces). 
182. Peter Singer, Outsourcing War, BROOKINGS, 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/outsourcing-war/ (Mar. 1, 2005) 
[https://perma.cc/M4XF-VVE8]. 
183. Snyder, supra note 26, at 71. 
184. Singer, supra note 33, at 248. 
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wide array of military air and artillery support units.185 These tasks 
often blur the conventional civilian-soldier divide and were once the 
exclusive domain of enlisted soldiers.186 Moreover, private military 
firms, such as Blackwater, often “recruit” employees direct from the 
various military branches of the United States, giving many PMCs 
the same valuable military training active soldiers receive.187  
Combat operations are not the only area in which PMCs have 
encroached on the traditional domain of soldiers. For example, 
contemporary PMCs have been tasked with overseeing and 
instructing cadets in Reserve Officer Training Programs, as well as 
assisting senior military officers in making military decisions and staff 
planning.188 To wit, prior to the invasion of Iraq, PMCs assisted 
military planners with “war-gaming” and conducting field exercises in 
the lead up to invasion.189 Further, in numerous instances after the 
fall of Saddam Hussein, PMCs provided training for Iraqi military and 
police forces.190 PMCs are also a vital component of security details, 
providing security on military bases and security details for American 
military convoys.191 Some PMCs even built and guarded the United 
States main forward operating base, Camp Doha, in Kuwait.192 
Moreover, PMCs are frequently tasked with manning and 
maintaining military weaponry and equipment. As Peter Singer notes, 
PMCs in Iraq were often tasked with maintaining and arming highly 
sophisticated weapons platforms such as the F-15 fighter, F-117 
stealth fighter, and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.193 In some cases, 
PMCs did more than just maintain these systems; for example, PMCs 
have operated combat systems such as the Global Hawk UAV and air 
 
185. Snyder, supra note 26, at 71. 
186. Michaels, supra note 179, at 1019; see also Sacilotto, supra note 6, at 
181 quoting U.S. Gov. Accountability Office (“The U.S. military has 
long used contractors to provide supplies and services to deployed U.S. 
forces. . . Today, contractors provide deployed U.S. forces with 
communication services; interpreters who accompany military patrols; 
base operations support (e.g., food and housing); weapons systems 
maintenance; intelligence analysis; and a variety of other support. Many 
of these contractors live and work side by side with their military 
counterparts and share many of the same risks and hardships”) 
(emphasis added). 
187. Hamaguchi, supra note 5, at 1058 (2008); see also Singer, supra note 33, 
at 76. 
188. Peters, supra note 27, at 383. 
189. Singer, supra note 33, at 247. 
190. Id. at 248. 
191. Cullen, supra note 41, at 513. 
192. Singer, supra note 33, at 247.  
193. Id.  
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defense systems such as Patriot Missile batteries, as well as defense 
systems on board United States Navy vessels.194 
B. The Civilian and Military Justice: Who Falls Under Military 
Jurisdiction and What Crimes Are Applicable to PMCs? 
The second prong to be considered when analyzing the 
permissibility of subjecting an individual to military jurisdiction is 
whether said individual could reasonably be determined to be in the 
land or naval forces.195 Based on an examination of relevant case law, 
a PMC could conceivably be considered to be in the land or naval 
forces, if: (1) they serve active and significant or vital roles in regards 
to military operations, and; (2) undertake these roles while 
accompanying military forces “in the field”, during times of active 
hostilities. For the reasons discussed in the preceding section, this 
Note contends that the soldier-like roles filled by PMCs in 
contemporary times renders PMCs de-facto military. Thus, this Note 
argues that PMCs constitute a unique class of civilians, separate from 
the types of civilians that have been historically exempted from 
military jurisdiction. As a result, the extension of military jurisdiction 
to PMCs is permissible.  
1.  Vital Cogs: Comparing the Role of Contemporary PMCs to Other 
Civilians 
For a PMC to fall under military jurisdiction, it would have to be 
shown that they were sufficiently “soldier-like” as to be considered a 
de facto member of the United States land and naval forces.196 That 
is, a PMC would likely have to have a significant and on-going 
connection with the military. Additionally, there would likely need to 
be articulable facts that indicate a PMC was integral to the military 
due to their role. 
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases addressing the 
permissibility of military jurisdiction over civilians was Ex parte 
Milligan, which was decided soon after the United States Civil War.197 
In Milligan, the defendant, a citizen of Indiana was sentenced to 
death by a military commission.198 The Supreme Court, however, 
granted defendant’s writ of habeas corpus, holding that the 
defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by being 
subjected to a military trial.199  
 
194. Id. 
195. Price, supra note 11, at 501.   
196. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1071.   
197. Id. at 1068. 
198. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123(1866). 
199. Id. at 123. 
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Although Milligan largely stands for the proposition that an open 
and functioning Article III court is the proper venue for a civilian 
accused of criminal conduct,200 the Milligan opinion also speaks to a 
civilian’s role within the military. Numerous times throughout its 
opinion, the majority stresses the fact that the defendant was neither 
in active military service, nor did he have any connection, substantial 
or otherwise, with military forces of the United States.201 As some 
commentators have pointed out, however, it is likely the modern-day 
PMC is distinguishable from the defendant in Milligan.202  Unlike the 
Milligan defendant, who had absolutely no connection with any 
military force, PMCs are deeply ingrained with the military and often 
serve in roles that are vital to the success of military operations. 
In the decades following Milligan, the Supreme Court would 
decide a series of cases which are likely relevant to determining the 
status of the modern-day PMC. In both Ex parte Reed and Johnson 
v. Sayre, the Court held that civilian employees of the Navy had been 
sufficiently integrated into the military to fall under the military 
justice system’s jurisdiction.203 
Both Reed and Sayre were civilian employees, serving as 
“paymasters” for the Navy.204 In Reed, the Court described the 
significant role that a paymaster held within the Navy, stating that: 
The place of paymaster’s clerk is an important one in 
the machinery of the navy . . . The good order and efficiency of 
the service depend largely upon the faithful performance of their 
duties.205 
 
The Court in Sayre would reaffirm the belief that a paymaster was 
sufficiently integrated with the Navy, holding that:  
[Sayre] was therefore, as has been directly adjudged by this 
court, a person in the naval service . . . and subject to be tried . 
. .  by a general court martial.206  
In a similar fashion, PMCs could be considered sufficiently 
integrated into the armed forces. For instance, some PMCs dress in 
 
200. Id. at 127. 
201. See generally id. 
202. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1068.  
203. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 21 (denying applicants writ for habeas 
corpus); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 118 (reversing appellate court’s 
decision, and remanding applicant to military custody). 
204. See Reed, 100 U.S.; Sayre 158 U.S. 
205. Reed, 100 U.S. at 21-22 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
206. Sayre, 158 U.S. 15 (citing Reed, 100 U.S.). 
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military-style uniforms,207 and as has been previously mentioned in 
this Note, PMCs and American troops are frequently considered by 
local populations to be one in the same.208 More importantly, PMCs 
serve a vital role in the modern-day American military; not only do 
PMCs serve in numbers that have surpassed actual military 
personnel, but they serve in increasingly vital roles which are essential 
to the military’s objectives.209 Perhaps the most revealing insight into 
how PMCs are utilized is the fact that PMCs die in fairly significant 
numbers serving with the military.210  
It is also interesting to note that both Reed and Sayre involved 
civilians who had signed agreements in which they agreed to subject 
themselves to the laws of the military.211  A later Supreme Court case, 
McElroy v. United States, cited Sayre and noted that the lack of a 
contractual stipulation was a factor that suggested the defendant did 
not fall under the jurisdiction of the military.212 A similar clause was 
briefly considered in Ali, where the Court noted that Ali’s contract 
did not contain a clause informing Ali of his potential liability under 
the UCMJ.213 Yet, the Court held this did not preclude the court from 
holding Ali fell under the jurisdiction of the court-martial.214 Thus, in 
light of Ali, Sayre, Reed, and McElroy, a court ruling on the status of 
a PMC may view such a contract as evidence that a PMC should fall 
under the jurisdiction of the military justice system. While such a 
provision would likely not be dispositive as to a PMCs status, the 
existence of a provision may be indicative of a significant relationship 
between a PMC and the military.  
207. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1049. 
208. Lindemann, supra note 24, at 85 ((citing Rene Merle, Census Counts 
100,000 Contractors in Iraq, WASHINGTON POST, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/12/04/A
R2006120401311.html) (quoting Major General William L. Nash) (“If 
you’re trying to win hearts and minds and the contractor is driving 90 
miles per hour through the streets and running over kids, that’s not 
helping the image of the American army. The Iraqis aren’t going to 
distinguish between a contractor and a soldier.”)) 
[https://perma.cc/CL6W-2V3Y]. 
209. See Singer, supra note 33, at 248 (stating that “[t]he Iraq operation 
could not have been carried out without private military support.”). 
210. See Lindemann, supra note 24 (noting that by 2007, over 900 PMCs had 
been killed in Iraq. Additionally, over 12,000 contractors were wounded 
in the same time frame.)   
211. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S 13, 19; Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 118. 
212. McElroy v. United States, 361 U.S. 281, 285 (1959). 
213. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 259 (2012).   
214. Id. at 259 (stating that “the contract stated that the work may take 
place in a combat zone or other dangerous environment but did not 
contain a provision notifying Ali that he was subject to the UCMJ.”). 
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In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, (1955), the 
Court held that the UCMJ does not apply to ex-service members who 
have “severed all relationships with the military.”215 Quarles, who had 
served in Korea, was honorably-discharged.216 Five months after his 
discharge, however, Quarles was arrested by military authorities on 
charges of a murder committed while he was in service and taken to 
Korea to stand trial by court-martial.217 
While the Court did acknowledge that Congress, as authorized by 
Article I of the Constitution, has the power to subject persons in the 
armed service to trial by court-martial, the Court held that: 
It has never been intimated by this Court, however, that Article 
I military jurisdiction could be extended to civilian ex-soldiers 
who had severed all relationship with the military and its 
institutions.218  
In declining to extend military jurisdiction to former service members, 
the Court explicitly noted that permitting such jurisdiction would 
“necessarily encroach on the jurisdiction of federal courts set up under 
Article III of the Constitution.”219  
Quarles thus reflects the belief that military jurisdiction may only 
be extended to those individuals that have an active or on-going 
connection or relationship with the military.220 As with the Court in 
Reid, however, the Court in Quarles failed to explicitly enumerate the 
type of connection or relationship a civilian must have with the 
military, and the Court merely held that a connection of some kind is 
a condition precedent.221 In sum, Quarles does not appear to 
definitively bar military jurisdiction over all civilians, just those that 
lack an existing or active connection with the military.   
Decided shortly after Quarles, and the enactment of the UCMJ, 
Reid v. Covert stands as the landmark case involving military 
jurisdiction over civilians.222 In Reid, the Supreme Court granted writs 
of habeas corpus to the wives of American service members after the 
 
215. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 (1955). 
216. Id. at 13. 
217. Id.  
218. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
219. Id. at 15. 
220. Id.  
221. See generally id. at 23 (“We hold that Congress cannot subject civilians 
like Toth to trial by court-martial.”).  
222. Corn, supra note at 104, at 494. 
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wives had been convicted of murder by courts-martial.223 The Court 
held that the wives’ conviction violated their Constitutional rights to 
a jury and grand-jury indictment, as the wives were merely 
dependents of military forces, and thus did not lose their civilian 
status.224 
While it is well-settled that Reid stands for the fact that a 
citizen’s Constitutional rights “follow” them outside of the territorial 
limits of the United States,225 it is just as important to highlight what 
the Court did not say in Reid. First, the plurality opinion based its 
holding largely on the fact that defendants were merely dependents of 
military force and that the dependents were convicted of capital 
offenses during a time of peace.226 Secondly, the Court addressed an 
entirely different provision of the UCMJ, as the defendants were 
convicted pursuant to Article 2(11) of the UCMJ.227 Lastly, the Court 
failed to draw a bright-line rule between civilians and military, stating 
that: 
Even if it were possible, we need not attempt here to precisely 
define the boundary between ‘civilians’ and members of the ‘land 
and naval Forces.” We recognize that there might be 
circumstances where a person could be ‘in’ the armed services 
for purposes of Clause 14 even though he had not formally been 
inducted into the military or did not wear a uniform.228 
In light of these omissions, some have proffered that Reid does 
not foreclose on all military jurisdiction of civilians and that the 
 
223. See generally Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18-19 (“[W]e conclude that the 
Constitution in its entirety applied to the trials of Mrs. Smith and Mrs. 
Covert. Since their courtmartial did not meet the requirements of Art. 
III, s 2, or the Fifth and Sixth Amendments we are compelled to 
determine if there is anything within the Constitution which authorizes 
the military trial of dependents accompanying the armed forces 
overseas.”). 
224. See id. at 20 (“The wives of servicemen are no more members of the 
‘land and naval Forces’ when living at a military post in England or 
Japan than when living at a base in this country or in Hawaii or 
Alaska.”). 
225. See id. at 5-6 (holding that “we reject the idea that when the United 
States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of the Bill of 
Rights.”). 
226. Id. at 5; see also id. at 49 (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (“I therefore 
conclude that, in capital cases, the exercise of court martial jurisdiction 
over civilian dependents in time of peace cannot be justified by Article 
I.”) (emphasis added). 
227. Id. at 3 (noting that the “court-martial asserted jurisdiction over Mrs. 
Covert under Article 2 (11) of the UCMJ.”) 
228. Id. at 22-23. (emphasis added). 
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absence of a bright-line definition of de facto soldier leaves open the 
possibility that a civilian could fall under military jurisdiction.229 
Thus, the court’s explicit failure to articulate when a civilian becomes 
a de facto member of the military, combined with the meaningful 
roles that contemporary PMCs fill, makes it possible a PMC could be 
distinguished from the civilian dependents in Reid.  
2.  Active Hostilities: When is a Civilian “in the Field?” 
Additionally, it appears well-settled that a PMC could only be 
deemed to be in the land and naval forces if their conduct took place 
in “the field” of “active hostilities”, during a time of “war.”230  
Reid, at length, discussed the fact that the defendant’s conviction 
took place during a time of peace.231 While the Court declined to 
extend jurisdiction to the defendant, it did note that courts have 
“upheld military trial of civilians performing services for the armed 
forces “in the field” during time of war.”232 In contrast to the 
defendant in Reid, who was living on a military base in the United 
Kingdom during a time of peace, PMCs who served in Iraq and other 
contingency operations are serving during a time of “war” under the 
amended language of the UCMJ.233 Moreover, as many of these PMCs 
serve alongside soldiers, including conducting combat operations and 
security details, it is arguable a PMC is precisely the type of civilian 
referenced in Reid who could permissibly fall under military 
jurisdiction.234  
In Ali, the Court also discussed the requirement that a civilian be 
“in the field” for the military to exercise jurisdiction over the 
individual. Describing what is meant by the phrase “in the field”, the 
Court explained that: 
We see no reason not to adopt [the] interpretation of “in the 
field,” which requires an area of actual fighting, for our analysis 
of Article 2(a)(10).235   
 
229. See Corn, supra note 104, at 506-507. 
230. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 33-34.   
231. See id.. at 23-27.   
232. Id. at 33; see also McElroy v. United States, 361 U.S. 281, 286 (1959) 
(discussing how past convictions of civilians under military law occurred 
in times of “hostilities”, while “in the field.”). 
233. See generally UCMJ.  
234. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 22-23 (discussing “that there might be 
circumstances where a person could be ‘in’ the armed services…even 
though he had not formally been inducted into the military or did not 
wear a uniform.”). 
235. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 264 (2012).   
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The Court further went on to explain the defendant’s connection with 
the military, noting that Ali lived at a forward combat outpost, faced 
daily attacks from insurgents and took part in missions that required 
him to travel by military convoy in armored vehicles.236 Under this 
definition of “in the field”, it is certainly arguable many PMCs could 
fall under military jurisdiction, as there is ample evidence to suggest 
the modern-day PMC is often in close proximity to actual fighting 
while they accompany military forces.237 For example, PMCs are 
frequently tasked with driving convoys through “high-risk” areas of 
war zones, and in there have been numerous cases where the United 
State military was forced to conduct rescue missions to recover 
disabled PMC vehicles.238   
For decades, prior to the amended wording in Article 2(a)(10), 
the Court of Military Appeals decision in United States v. Averette 
constituted a de facto elimination of extending military jurisdiction 
over civilians.239 While the holding in Averette was permissibly 
abrogated by the 2007 Amendment, given that Congress was within 
its Constitutional-limits to promulgate the laws of the military, it is 
still worth briefly examining Averette.240  
In Averette, a civilian contractor serving in Vietnam was 
convicted of larceny by a court-martial.241 On appeal to the Court of 
Military Appeals, however, the defendant’s conviction was overturned, 
with the majority holding that Article 2(10), which then read “in time 
of war”, only meant a Congressionally declared war.242 Applying this 
strict and literal interpretation of the phrase “in time of war”, the 
court believed that it was preventing the “possibility of civilian 
prosecutions by military courts whenever military action on a varying 
scale of intensity.”243 
By enacting the 2007 Amendment, Congress legislatively nullified 
the Averette holding.244 Assuming arguendo that the 2007 Amendment 
did not abrogate the Averette decision, it is arguable that Averette 
 
236. Id.  
237. See Lindemann, supra note 24, at 84-85 (discussing the 
interchangeability of uniformed and non-uniformed personnel of 
Blackwater USA personnel).  
238. Id. at 85 (explaining tasks of contractors). 
239. Corn, supra note 104, at 499. 
240. United States v. Averette, 42 C.M.R. 363, 363 (1970). 
241. Id.  
242. Id. at 365. 
243. Id.  
244. See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 262 (2012) (stating that 
“Congress amended the language of Article 2 in . . . 2007 . . . effectively 
nullifying Averette.”). 
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itself was incorrectly decided and should not be (or have) been 
binding legal authority.  
First, the holding in Averette directly contradicted prior Supreme 
Court precedent.245 Secondly, Averette ignored well-settled historical 
practices, for, as many commentators point out, the absence of a 
declaration of war during the Indian Wars during the 19th Century 
did not preclude military courts from exercising jurisdiction over 
civilian employees.246 Third, as the dissent in Averette noted, the 
majority construed the phrase “in time of war” in a manner 
inconsistent with how the phrase was applied in other portions of the 
UCMJ.247 As one of the major canons of statutory interpretation is to 
presume a consistent meaning of usage throughout the entirety of a 
statute,248 it is arguable that the Court applied the incorrect meaning 
of the phrase “in time of war” given its usage throughout the rest of 
the UCMJ.  As Congress was acting well within its Constitutional 
authority when it amended Article 2(10), however, it is likely that the 
Averette holding is moot regardless. 
3.  What is a Crime? Military Crimes, Capital Offenses and the PMC 
A major criticism of the application of military law to non-
military personnel, including PMCs, is the concern that actions that 
are criminal under the UCMJ may not have an analogous civilian 
crime.249 Because of this, many in support of the extension of military 
justice to PMCs have argued that criminal culpability should be 
limited to those crimes with a direct civilian analog.250 
 
245. See Peters, supra note 27, at 403 (noting that the holding in Averette 
ignored governing precedent, such as Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 
40 (1800), which indicated a formal declaration of war was not required 
for the United States to be at “war”. In Tingy, the Supreme Court of 
the United States held that “every contention by force between two 
nations, in external matters, under the authority of their respective 
governments, is not only war, but public war.”) (emphasis added). 
246. Id. at 402; see also Snyder, supra note 26, at 92. 
247. See Averette, 42 C.M.R. at 366 (Baker, C.J. dissenting) (noting that in 
a previous Court of Military Appeals case, the court had rejected a 
petitioner’s contention that court-martial jurisdiction pursuant to 
Article 2(10) depended on a Congressional declaration of war, in part 
because the phrase “in time of war”, as used in Articles 43 and 85(c) of 
the UCMJ, did not comport with that interpretation of the phrase). 
248. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994) (stating the 
precedent that “[a] term appearing in several places in a statutory text 
is generally read the same way each time it appears.”). 
249. Singer, supra note 44. 
250. See e.g. Chapman, supra note 12, at 1078-1079 (arguing that 
prosecution of PMCs for criminal conduct should be limited to crimes 
with civilian equivalents); see also Singer, supra note 44 (contending 
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In the estimation of this Note, however, such limitation would be 
the incorrect approach. As discussed previously, the overriding 
purpose of the creation of a military justice system is to ensure 
discipline amongst military forces. Vis-a-vis their conduct PMCs are 
essentially soldiers in all but name; it would stand to reason that they 
should be held to the same rigid disciplinary standards as actual 
military personnel. If PMCs were to be absolved of such 
responsibility, commanders, who fill the central role in court-martial 
proceedings, would be severely limited in their ability to hold PMCs 
accountable for criminal conduct. In turn, this would defeat the 
purposes of subjecting PMCs to military jurisdiction, namely: 
ensuring personal justice for injured parties and preventing harm to 
military objectives caused by the lack of discipline and misconduct of 
PMCs.  
Moreover, in at least one case, the Supreme Court has held that 
charging civilians with a military crime was permissible.251 In Reed, 
the defendant was charged and convicted by court-martial for the 
military crime of “malfeasance in the discharge of his official 
duties.”252 Vitally, the Court held that Reed was sufficiently 
integrated with the military to constitute a de facto soldier, making 
military crimes applicable to Reed.253 Accordingly, military crimes 
with no civilian analogs may be appropriate for PMCs, as PMCs 
could be reasonably be determined to be “in” the “land and naval 
forces”, and thus beholden to all laws of the military.  
The more controversial consideration is charging PMCs with 
capital crimes. In both Reid and Grisham v. Hagan, the Supreme 
Court appears to have expressly forbidden charging civilians with 
capital offense.254 It is important to note, however, that both of these 
cases involved civilians who were not deemed in be “in” the military, 
and were merely dependents or civilian employees.255 Moreover, both 
of these cases involved crimes that were committed during times of 
 
that PMCs should only be held liable under the UCMJ for crimes that 
would be felonies had they occurred in the United States). 
251. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 19-23 (1879).  
252. Id. at 20 
253. See generally id. at 22 (holding that Reed is a member of the naval 
service as a paymaster’s clerk and as such, is under the jurisdiction of a 
naval court).  
254. See generally id. at 21 (explaining jurisdictional questions with respect 
to capital offenses); see also Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (“the 
death penalty is so irreversible that a dependent . . . must have the 
benefit of a jury.”). 
255. See generally id. at 21-22 (explaining Reed’s position and its importance 
in the military); See also Grisham, 361 U.S. at 279 (explaining the 
petitioner’s civilian status).  
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peace, far away from the “field” or any active hostilities.256 Although 
it is unclear how a court would rule on the matter involving a civilian, 
imposition of the death penalty is permissible under military law.257 
Consequently, provided a PMC was deemed “in” the “land and naval 
forces” and the crime occurred during a time of war, it is arguable a 
PMC could be charged with a capital offense. 
Thus, in light of the above mentioned reasoning, this Note urges 
the application of the following crimes to PMCs under military 
jurisdiction: First, PMCs could potentially be charged with capital 
offenses under the 2007 Amendment, as it is arguable that the Reid 
and Grisham’s holdings, forbidding convictions for capital offenses, 
are limited to times of peace and cases involving civilians with an 
unsubstantial connection to the military. Secondly, PMCs could be 
charged with any non-capital offense, whether it has a civilian 
equivalent. While this may lead to unsavory circumstances where a 
PMC is charged with a crime that does not exist in the civilian world, 
given the discipline rationales giving rise to military justice, failing to 
charge PMCs with these offenses could potentially lead to sharp 
declines in military effectiveness. 
VI. Conclusion 
As the use of PMCs as soldier-like replacements for actual 
military personnel appears likely to continue, it stands to reason that 
events such as Nisour Square and the Triple Canopy shooting will 
reoccur. When such events occur they will invariably cause backlash 
against the United States military, hampering its efforts and 
objective. As such, it is imperative that PMC conduct be reined in 
and PMC held accountable when they commit crimes. 
The 2007 Amendment, extending military jurisdiction over PMCs, 
represents the best mechanism for ensuring PMC accountability. The 
military justice system exists to punish the very misconduct engaged 
in by PMCs; moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that 
forbids the extension of military justice to civilians, provided certain 
circumstances exist. Although critics may claim that such extension 
would violate PMCs constitutional rights, it is well-settled that the 
Constitution applies differently in the military justice context. 
Accordingly, when an individual finds themselves under the 
 
256. See id. at 19-20 (case in which petitioner was charged with malfeasance 
while stationed in South America, but not during wartime); see also 
Grisham, 361 U.S. at 310 (case in which petitioner was charged with 
premeditated murder while working as a civilian employee of the Army, 
but not during active hostilities). 
257. Clark Smith, Fair and Impartial? Military Jurisdiction and the Decision 
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jurisdiction of the military justice system, their Constitutional rights 
are not the same as they would receive in the civilian realm. 
As this Note has argued, PMCs undoubtedly fail within the 
narrow exception of civilians to whom the UCMJ could 
Constitutionally apply too. PMCs engage in activity that few would 
hesitate to consider soldier-like; to wit, most “civilians” do not 
operate missile batteries on a daily basis as some PMCs do. Moreover, 
PMCs are frequently in the thick of active hostilities and often serve 
next to actual soldiers fighting “the field.” Consequently, PMCs are 
sufficiently integrated into the military so as to fall under its laws, 
and thus, the 2007 Amendment, as it applies to PMCs should (and 
can) survive Constitutional scrutiny. 
 
